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Abstract. Demand for the construction of retirement villages is increasing with the worldwide growth in ageing popula-
tions. However, the development of retirement villages can be impeded by many factors, such as limited available land and 
high investment costs. Public–private partnership (PPP) as an alternative financing mechanism has been widely applied in 
the construction of public infrastructure projects and may provide new funding sources for building retirement villages. 
By applying PPP to the construction of retirement villages, the independent living requirements of seniors can be met and 
the financial difficulty of the construction of retirement villages can be resolved. Similar to other PPP projects, when re-
tirement villages are constructed under a PPP process, the concession period is a key decision variable in relation to the 
success of the project. The concession period is stated in the project contract between the government and private inves-
tors, and stipulates the date when the project ownership and operation are transferred from the private investor back to the 
government. The government should take detailed information into consideration at the initial project stage when deter-
mining the concession period. This paper proposes PPP as a new procurement method to be applied to the construction 
of rental retirement villages and develops a concession period determination process for PPP retirement village projects 
with consideration of real options, focusing on the option to defer. An empirical example with alternative scales, which 
is developed from an existing retirement village in Geelong, Australia, is used to numerically verify the process and the 
impacts of key variables on the concession period. The determination process provides an alternative tool for governments 
to design the concession period before the tendering stage and will benefit the development of industries associated with 
services for the ageing population. This process can also be applied to the construction of other financially non-viable PPP 
projects such as social housing.
Keywords: concession period, option to defer, public–private partnership, real option, retirement village.
Introduction
There has been steady growth in the ageing population 
in Australia. Significant increases have been seen in the 
proportions of older age groups over recent decades. The 
number of private renters aged 65 and over will increase by 
131% from 2011 to 2031 (Wood, Ong, & Cigdem, 2017). 
Expenditure on the Age Pension is by far the largest grow-
ing government expense and is projected to be over $72 
billion in 2023–24 (National Commission of Audit, 2014). 
As housing costs take more than 30% of older renters’ 
household gross income, the growth in the ageing popu-
lation will increase the demand for affordable age-friendly 
housing and make the provision of sustainable housing 
for older people of great importance (Aged and Commu-
nity Service Australia, 2015; Wood, Ong, & Cigdem, 2014; 
Xia, Zuo, Skitmore, Chen, & Rarasati, 2015). Many seniors 
have to downsize their houses to improve their financial 
position. The majority of older people prefer to live inde-
pendently, but this does not necessarily mean they must 
own a house rather than living in rental accommodation 
(COTA Australia, 2017). Many countries have their own 
housing models to support independent living for seniors, 
such as retirement housing with some support in the UK, 
independent living communities in the USA and purpose-
built housing for the elderly in Singapore. Retirement vil-
lages in Australia are similar to these housing models and 
have become an emerging accommodation alternative to 
meet the requirements of retirees, and their development 
has great potential.
Given the rapidly ageing Australian population, it is 
important that the government supports the growth of 
the retirement village sector, which is privately financed, 
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houses low-income people, provides safe and secure living 
environments, and contributes to ageing in place (Aged 
and Community Service Australia, 2015). Governments 
and the retirement village industry are having ongoing 
discussions around proactive and innovative ways to re-
duce the costs of developing age-friendly affordable hous-
ing and to provide incentives for purchasing it (Aged and 
Community Service Australia, 2015). The rental village 
model, which currently occupies a limited part of the 
market, represents the dominant retirement-living model 
globally and is expected to grow in the Australian retire-
ment-living market (Owen, 2015). The private and not-
for-profit sectors play large roles in meeting the needs of 
seniors and building retirement villages.
Retirement-village development which follows a tra-
ditional procurement process requires significant capital 
investment to construct multiple residential properties 
(IBISWorld, 2017). Therefore, barriers to entry into the 
industry are high for small and medium companies, which 
need more support from the government. It is shown in 
industry reports that one of the costs associated with 
retirement villages that reduces feasibility for develop-
ers is the Goods and Services Tax (GST). Also, the high 
costs of land and associated costs make retirement village 
projects generally less attractive than residential housing 
projects, and less viable in regional and remote Australia 
(COTA Australia, 2017; Retirement Village Association, 
2011). Low living costs used to be one of the contribut-
ing factors to seniors’ decisions to relocate to retirement 
villages (Gardner, Browning, & Kendig, 2005; Stimson & 
Mccrea, 2004). However, as service fees have risen along 
with higher building costs, economic pressure has become 
one of the barriers to older people moving into retirement 
villages (Liu, Ma, & Liu, 2016).
These realities create a great opportunity to apply 
public–private partnership (PPP) to the construction 
of retirement villages as an innovative form of develop-
ment. PPP, as a collaborative strategic management ap-
proach, is widely used across the world to deliver public 
services, bring together the public and private sectors in a 
mid-to-long-term relationship, and sustain business pros-
pects that allow the parties to blend their special skills to 
serve the needs and interests of the public (Alam, Kabir, 
& Chaudhri, 2014). This cooperation is one of the most 
critical success criteria for a PPP project (Osei-Kyei, Chan, 
Javed, & Ameyaw, 2017) and is particularly important for 
developers whose expertise lies in building aged care facil-
ities, as they need to focus on a good relationship with the 
public sector. The integration of PPP and retirement vil-
lages is an option worth considering in relation to meeting 
the growing market demand for retirement villages and 
achieving the goal of developing age-friendly affordable 
housing while reducing government expense and need to 
build social housing.
When a retirement village is constructed under a PPP 
process, the concession period is an important variable 
for the purpose of determining the economic and finan-
cial viability of the project, and is often discussed inten-
sively during the negotiation period (Shen, Bao, Wu, & Lu, 
2007). While the private sector prefers a longer concession 
period to gain more benefits, this can result in a loss to 
the government. A shorter concession period may lead to 
failure to achieve expected returns for the private sector 
and so a higher level of user charge, which may damage 
the social benefit (Khanzadi, Nasirzadeh, & Alipou, 2012; 
Yu & Lam, 2013). Therefore, it is important to the success 
of a PPP retirement village project to determine an ap-
propriate concession period. Many researchers have con-
ducted studies on optimising the length of the concession 
period, involving diverse methods like net present value 
(NPV) and real options. Real options theory is a recent 
improvement to the mathematical model to include ad-
ditional values for these projects. There may be several 
types of real options in a PPP project, such as a guarantee 
option, an option to expand, an option to defer and an 
option to abandon. Most of the results of these studies are 
associated with the evaluation of the guarantee option and 
give a bounded time interval within a range, while their 
target projects are financially viable ones such as toll roads 
and highways.
This paper proposes PPP as a new method to construct 
retirement villages in order to provide an affordable inde-
pendent living environment for seniors, and defines a spe-
cific concession period for PPP retirement village projects 
associated with early government investment and the op-
tion to defer. The process refers to the irreversible invest-
ment model developed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and 
the variables are set to fit retirement village projects. The 
structure of the paper is organised as follows. Following 
this introduction, the international context of retirement 
housing models is summarised and then a PPP process is 
proposed for retirement villages. A literature review of the 
existing research on concession periods is presented next. 
Then come the formulas for the proposed model. Real 
options theory is used to identify the concession period 
interval and the optimal concession period. An empiri-
cal study with alternative scales, which is developed from 
an existing retirement village, is conducted to verify the 
model. Lastly, the results are discussed for further implica-
tions and a conclusion is drawn.
1. International experience of retirement housing 
models
Different countries vary in their economic conditions and 
the degree of development of ageing services. These ele-
ments determine their views about how best to manage 
their ageing populations and therefore the formulation 
of policy in the retirement housing sector. International 
experience of retirement housing models may provide 
sources of innovation and learning. These models in two 
developed countries, the USA and the UK (Jones, Howe, 
Tilse, Bartlett, & Stimson, 2010), and two Asian developed 
countries, Singapore (Yuen & Soh, 2017) and Japan (Bra-
sor & Tsubuku, 2014; Tsutsui, 2010), are now investigated 
in order to examine this international experience.
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Excluding house ownership and private rental, retire-
ment housing can be divided into three categories based 
on the purpose and level of service provision. The first 
category is general-purpose housing, which is usually 
dominated by the public sector, does not provide ageing 
services and is suitable for older people who can live in-
dependently. Examples are senior apartments in the USA, 
two-room flexi flats in Singapore and rental housing for 
the elderly in Japan. These homes can be for sale or rental 
and senior-friendly fittings can be added when needed. 
Social housing provided by governments for low-income 
seniors is another option.
Age-specific housing, also called purpose-built housing 
for the elderly in Singapore, is the second category. This 
is accommodation that has been specifically constructed 
for or allocated to older people. Private sectors and local 
communities play significant roles in the development of 
this type of housing, which provides daily or continuing 
care services and support. Subcategories based on archi-
tectural and community types include service-integrated 
housing and housing that provides care services. Some 
service-integrated housing offers lifestyle and recreation 
options, such as active adult retirement communities in 
the USA and retirement communities in Singapore, while 
others only offer support services within an independent 
living complex or shared housing. Retirement villages in 
the UK and USA, sheltered housing in the UK and Singa-
pore, mobile home parks in the USA and silver housing 
in Japan are examples of independent living complexes, 
while Abbeyfield housing in the UK and board and care 
homes in the USA are shared housing. Some housing with 
care services provide daily support and care, such as as-
sisted living facilities in the USA and the UK and licensed 
private senior housing in Japan, while other types provide 
continuing care, in the USA and Japan.
The third category of retirement housing is residen-
tial aged care facilities, also called long-term care homes. 
The most common type and one that is recognised widely 
is nursing homes, which provide long-term nursing care 
for seniors who cannot live independently but cannot be 
cared for at home or in their community. These facilities 
require high standards of care services and are usually 
bed-based, operating with government subsidies. Other 
examples are group homes in Japan and skilled nursing 
facilities in the USA, which are for older people who have 
chronic conditions such as dementia.
In Australia, there are similar models in each category, 
although with different names. To meet the complex needs 
of different ageing groups the second category, age-spe-
cific housing, is attracting more attention, especially the 
subcategory of the independent living complex. As an in-
termediate type between general housing and residential 
care facilities, retirement villages are an effective housing 
model within the independent living subcategory that can 
meet most seniors’ housing needs, but their development 
requires more involvement from the government. Com-
pared to development led by only the public or the private 
sectors individually, a model of partnership between these 
two parties would bring about improved living environ-
ments for older people. The application of PPP to retire-
ment villages could act as a bridge between the public and 
private sectors.
2. Practicability of PPP application to  
retirement villages
Retirement villages whose construction is dominated by 
the more efficient private sector would under PPP then 
fall into the category of quasi-public goods and become an 
effective component of government-led aged care facili-
ties. There are two important features in the application of 
PPP to retirement villages. First, PPP is generally applied 
in the field of infrastructure construction and public ser-
vices, while retirement villages are also part of the long-
term housing infrastructure of public services for seniors, 
so they complement each other well in this field. Second, 
investment in retirement villages has the characteristics of 
being long-term, stable and high security, which is consist-
ent with PPP projects. Applying PPP to retirement villages 
would not only reduce the government’s financial stress, 
but also utilise the idle funds of the private sector while 
meeting the living needs of older people (Yang, Zhou, & 
Tan, 2017). Under the PPP model, the government trans-
fers the responsibility for retirement village operation to 
the private sector, but retains vital responsibilities such as 
policy development and industry supervision. The qual-
ity of ageing services is improved through public resource 
integration and reasonable competition (Tang & Feng, 
2016). The construction of PPP retirement village projects 
would allow the government and private sector to share 
the project risks, with positive impacts on both investment 
and the operation of the projects. The incentive of govern-
ment subsidies would have a beneficial effect on the net 
cash flow of such retirement village projects. Alongside 
the construction of retirement villages, related industries 
such as ageing services and superannuation could also be 
developed in common.
The project structure of a PPP retirement village can 
be similar to those of other PPP projects which have user-
pay structures. Figure 1 illustrates a potential pattern of 
PPP application to rental retirement village projects. The 
government offers public funds as an early investment in 
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to reduce the investment 
cost and strengthen the financial viability of the project. 
The government assigns an entity representing the public 
sector to offer part of the total investment and authorises 
a department to supervise the project. The government 
also provides land for the construction of the retirement 
village. The private sector injects the remainder of the 
needed capital in the total investment and forms an SPV 
with the government entity. There may be subcontractors 
assigned by the SPV to take responsibility for construct-
ing and operating the village, and the SPV is allowed to 
charge senior renters a weekly rent to recover the capi-
tal cost during the concession period. In addition to the 
rental revenue, the SPV can provide other services agreed 
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on by the government to gain other operation revenue, 
such as meal packages, parking and linen services. The 
private sector receives a profit return from the SPV. The 
government requires an annual benefit as land rent, as well 
investment returns from the SPV. When the concession 
period ends, the retirement village is transferred back to 
the public sector.
3. State-of-the-art of concession period 
determination methods
The concession period is one of the most important de-
termining variables in a PPP project. Scholars have con-
ducted many studies on the optimisation of the conces-
sion period. NPV is used as the analytical foundation for 
these studies. A summary of the methods based on NPV 
is given in Table 1. For example, Shen, Li, and Li (2002) 
conducted a preliminary study that utilised NPV calcula-
tion to create a build-operation transfer concession period 
model that could protect the interests of both the govern-
ment and the private sector. Then this model was extend-
ed to take risk impacts into consideration (Shen & Wu, 
2005). With the development of simulation techniques, 
diverse supplementary methods are integrated in order to 
optimise the concession period. Monte Carlo simulation 
has been used to simulate the risk factors and uncertain-
ties (Carbonara, Costantino, & Pellegrino, 2014; Zhang, 
2009), while game theory has been added to consider the 
bargaining behaviours of the parties, both of which re-
fine the concession period to a very narrow range (Bao, 
Peng, Ablanedo-Rosas, & Gao, 2015; Shen, Bao, Wu, & 
Lu, 2007). System dynamics is another technique for rep-
resenting the relationships between the variables in order 
to optimise the concession period (Khanzadi, Nasirzadeh, 
& Alipour, 2012; Song, Song, & Zhang, 2015). All these 
simulation techniques improve the accuracy of NPV, but 
are mostly adapted to transportation projects. Retirement 
villages as housing projects have some differences from 
transportation projects.
The traditional NPV method is a static assessment 
method, as it estimates the value of a PPP project without 
considering the uncertainty of future cash flows (Ashuri, 
Kashani, Molenaar, Lee, & Lu, 2011). Real options theory 
was first put forward by Myers (1977) and brought a new 
way of thinking to investment decision theory in order to 
resolve the limitations of the NPV method, especially for 
physical assets. The analysis of real options allows inves-
tors to choose the best opportunity to invest in, giving 
investment decisions a broader time range and provid-
ing a longer term strategic view. PPP projects require a 
large scale of investment and the private sector needs to 
consider many uncertain factors. In the past decade, real 
options theory has been used to conduct research on the 
investment decision-making of PPP projects. Most of this 
research has focused on evaluation of the value of guaran-
tee options (Almassi, McCabe, & Thompson, 2013; Mirza-
deh & Birgisson, 2015; Wibowo & Kochendoerfer, 2011), 
while some other scholars have considered the real op-
tions related to project performance, such as negotiation 
and early termination (Huang & Pi, 2013; Liu & Cheah, 
2009; Xiong & Zhang, 2016).
Public sector Private sector 
Special Purpose Vehicle
Retirement village
Senior renter 
Supervision
Transfer at the end of 
concession period
Construction 
and operation
Land 
rent
Investment
Sub-contractors
Prot 
return
Rent Other 
payment
Investment
Other 
service
Accommodation
Figure 1. Project structure of a PPP retirement village project
Table 1. Simulation techniques assisting NPV method on concession period determination
Research approach Applied project Research result Literature
NPV General projects Time interval Shen, Li, and Li (2002)
NPV+ Monte Carlo 
simulation
Transportation projects,
port projects
Time interval Shen and Wu (2005), Zhang (2009)
Specific time Ng, Xie, Cheung, and Jefferies (2007), 
Carbonara et al. (2014)
NPV + bargaining game 
theory
General projects Time interval Shen, Bao, Wu, and Lu (2007), Hanaoka 
and Palapus (2012)
Specific time Bao, Peng, Ablanedo-Rosas, and Gao (2015)
NPV + system dynamics Transportation projects Time interval Khanzadi, Nasirzadeh, and Alipour (2012)
Waste-to-energy incineration projects Specific time Song, Song, and Zhang (2015)
NPV + discrete stochastic 
process
Transportation projects Specific time Xu and Moon (2014)
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Few studies have applied real options in order to op-
timise concession periods directly. Applying real options 
theory to concession period determination for PPP pro-
jects is conducive to making more scientific investment 
decisions. With the help of Monte Carlo simulation, the 
guarantee option has been applied to determine the con-
cession period for toll-road and water-supply projects 
(Huang & Lv, 2016; Zhao & He, 2010). In addition to the 
guarantee option, project evaluation should incorporate 
the option to defer in order to achieve a comprehensive 
view, because of the uncertainty and irreversibility of such 
investment (Doan & Menyah, 2012). If the government 
prefers to invest immediately and grant the PPP without 
the option to defer, the investment will only be optimal 
when the NPV is positive. If the NPV is negative, some in-
centive must compensate the private sector by an amount 
equivalent to the negative NPV (Rocha Armada, Pereira, 
& Rodrigues, 2012).
The classical irreversible investment model developed 
by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) regards investment oppor-
tunities as American options and considers the value of 
delaying investment. Referring to this model, Lv, Ye, Liu, 
Shen, and Wang (2014) built a related model to optimise 
the concession period for tollway projects, and this model 
was also applied to urban rail projects (Lv, Liu, Zou, & 
Gan, 2016). The D-P model can be applied only if a pro-
ject has a continuous cash flow and a unique source of 
uncertainty, and investors can choose the time to invest. 
The cash flow of rental retirement villages, which mainly 
comes from the weekly rent, is continuous. The demand 
for these villages is the only uncertainty, according to 
which both the government and private sectors must make 
investment decisions. Therefore, this paper applies the op-
tion to defer in order to determine an effective concession 
period interval for PPP retirement village projects based 
on the D-P model and chooses a specific concession pe-
riod to achieve maximum benefit from the whole project.
4. Modelling concession period with option to 
defer for PPP retirement villages
4.1. Concession period interval and investment 
threshold for PPP retirement villages
Investors can choose the best time for their company to 
implement an investment program and this choice brings 
an option to defer. The option to defer helps investors rec-
ognise more uncertainties before the expiration date. The 
determination process of the concession period for PPP 
retirement villages proposed in this paper consists of two 
steps. The first is using the D-P model with the option to 
defer in order to find the critical investment threshold and 
the concession period interval, and the second step is in-
corporating the value of the options into the optimisation 
of the concession period. There are two basic assumptions 
regarding the proposed PPP concession period determina-
tion model. First, the cost of investment during the con-
struction and operation periods of the PPP retirement 
village project is partly or completely irreversible and the 
total investment is put into construction completely at 
the initial stage of the project without considering bank 
loans or other financing sources. Second, the demand for 
the retirement village N (the number of units) is affected 
by several factors, such as the economic conditions, the 
population growth and the accommodation preferences 
of seniors. Therefore, demand is assumed to follow a sto-
chastic process dN dt  t t tN N dW= α + σ  where t refers to 
the time, α is the expected growth rate, σ is the demand 
volatility and dW is an increment of a Wiener process 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).
The expected value of a PPP retirement village project 
for the government Fg(N) can be expressed as:
( ) 0 1 0
0
– ( ) –
c n
c
T T
tt
g
T
R t N
F N E e Xdt C dt K Iρ
  ⋅ ⋅  = + −
  
 
μ

∫ ∫ . (1)
In Equation (1), Tc is the concession period, Tn is the 
economic life of the project, ρ stands for the discount 
rate of the project, X means the annual government ben-
efit, R · t represents the annual rental revenue where R is 
the weekly rent and t equals 52 weeks, μ represents the 
proportion of rental revenue in total operation revenue, 
C0 refers to the annual operation cost of the project and 
K1 refers to the proportion of government investment in 
the total investment I0. The project value includes the one-
time government investment in the initial stage, the cash 
flows during the concession period and the cash flows af-
ter the transfer until the end of the project’s economic life.
Due to the irreversibility of investment, the D-P model 
is adapted to solve the value of the option to defer and 
the project value. In consideration of specific conditions, 
the project value of the government is given by (see Ap-
pendix A):
( )
( )
( )
1
–
– –
1 0
–
– –
1 0
1– – –                       
1– – –  ,
T
oT T
g
g Tg oT T
g
g
CX N Rtee e K I N N
F N
N CN X Rtee e K I N N
N
δ
δ δ
β
δ
δ δ

+ ≥ ρ
=      + <   ρ δ μ
ρ δ μ
  ρ 
,
(2)
where: 
2
1 2 2 2
1 – – 1 2– –    1
2 2
ρ δ ρ δ ρ 
β = + + > σ σ σ 
 and 
δ = ρ−α , while α is the annual growth rate of the demand.
The investment threshold of the government can be 
solved as (see Appendix B):
( )1 0
1
1
1
1
o T T
g T
C XK I e e
N
Rte
−δ −δ
−δ
 
+ − − ρ ρβ  = δ
β −
μ
. (3)
The government is willing to invest in the project only 
when the estimated demand gN N≥  and has a maximum 
acceptable concession period Tg, which must satisfy:
1
1
1 0
–1 – –
1 ln
–
o
g
CRtN X
T
XK I
β 
 μ δβ ρ ρ =
 δ
 ρ 
. (4)
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Similarly, on the other side the expected value of the 
private sector Fp(N) can be written as:
–
2 0
0
( ) ( – – ) –
cT
tt
p o
R t N
F N E e C X dt K Iρ
  ⋅ ⋅  =
  μ
  
∫ ,  (5)
where: K2 is the proportion of private sector investment in 
the total investment and K2 = 1 – K1. This value includes 
the one-time private investment and the cash flows during 
the concession period.
The solution of Equation (5) is represented as (see Ap-
pendix A):
( )
( )
( )
1
–
2 0
–
2 0
– – 1– –                        
– – 1–   .–  
o T
p
p
o T
p
p
CRtN X e K I N N
F N
CN RtN X e K I N N
N
δ
β
δ
 
≥ μδ ρ ρ =         <     μδ ρ ρ    
,
(6)
The investment threshold of the private sector PN  can 
be solved as (see Appendix C):
( )1 –2 0
–1
1 1–
–1 (1– )
o T
P
T
C XN K I e
Rt e
δ
δ
 β  
= δ + +  β ρ ρ  
μ
.  
(7)
The private sector is willing to invest in the project 
only when the estimated demand pN N≥  and has a mini-
mum acceptable concession period Tp, which must satisfy:
1
1
1
2 0
1
–1–
1 ln
–152–
o
p
o
C X RtN
T
C X RNK I
β 
+ ρ ρ μ δβ =
 βδ + + ρ ρ μ δβ 
. (8)
To determine the concession period interval, the so-
lution of Tg and Tp should satisfy the condition p gT T≤  
and, when Tp  = Tg, there exists a balanced investment 
threshold point N0 for both parties, which is:
0
1
0
1 –1
oCI
N
Rt
 
+ β ρ = δ
 β
 μ 
. (9)
Therefore, only when the estimated demand 
0N  N≥ , the final concession period Tc falls into the inter-
val  ,  p gT T    and ( )0N max ,  ,  g pN N N≥  will both the 
government and the private sector invest in the project.
4.2. Optimal concession period for PPP retirement 
villages
The concept of extended net present value (ENPV) is 
now adapted to determine the optimal concession period. 
The ENPV of the project value is given by the sum of the 
original NPV of the project and the value of the real op-
tion (Cruz & Marques, 2013; Rocha Armada, Pereira, & 
Rodrigues, 2012):
( ) ( )ENPV N =NPV N +W(N). (10)
As there is a condition of incomplete information, the 
government expects the private sector to be willing to in-
vest in the project with a positive attitude of cooperation; 
hence the determination of the concession period can sat-
isfy the need for maximum overall benefit of the project. 
The ENPV of the project equals the sum of the govern-
ment’s and the private sector’s ENPV, which is ENPVrv = 
ENPVg  + ENPVp  (see Appendix A):
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(11)
The function of ENPVrv  is an increasing function and 
has a maximum value, so the equilibrium solution of the 
concession period cT  can be accomplished by deriving 
ENPVrv  and making dENPV / 0dT = :
1
1
–
– – –
dENPV / .
– –
p o
pT
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g o
g
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dT e
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 (12)
When Equation (12) = 0, N Np g= , so cT  is solved as:
0
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–
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–
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 
 ρ =
δ  
 ρ 
. (13)
If TC satisfies the condition p c gT T T≤ ≤ , TC is defined 
as the final concession period in the contract. The equilib-
rium solution of the concession period TC is related to the 
amount of total investment, the proportion of government 
investment, the government benefit from the private sec-
tor and the discount rate.
5. Application example
5.1. Concession period for a retirement village
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed concession 
period model with the option to defer and to illustrate 
the calculation process, a new rental retirement village is 
considered as if being built as a PPP project. The neces-
sary data has been collected based on current retirement 
villages and reasonable assumptions. The government 
may choose an average or a large capacity for a retire-
ment village, as different scales may affect the length of 
the concession period. Therefore, two cases are chosen for 
the proposed retirement village: an average capacity of 50 
units and a large capacity of 96 units. The floor area of 
each unit is 56 m2 with one bedroom. Facilities include a 
carpark, a small library, a dining room and a community 
social centre. The concession period for the new village 
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will now be determined by applying the proposed model.
The total investment I0 includes the construction costs 
of all the units and the facilities, a 15% professional fee, 
10% GST based on the construction costs and a 15% con-
tingency fee. The construction costs are estimated from 
the Construction Handbook. Referring to other PPP proj-
ects, it is assumed that the government provides 30% of 
the total investment. The operation cost, which includes 
the maintenance cost, can be estimated from the financial 
reports of a number of rental villages. A retirement vil-
lage industry report indicates that the volatility level of 
the industry is moderate, ranging from 3% to 10%. As 
the increasing demand for retirement villages is mainly 
caused by increase in the ageing population and exten-
sion of human lifespans, and remains very stable, a low 
volatility rate of 3% is applied in this research. The ini-
tial occupancy rate is 70% and the annual growth rate is 
estimated at 1.5%. The rent is set at AU$330 per week, 
which is lower than the market price in considering the 
improvement to public welfare. The proportion of the rent 
revenue is estimated to be 60%, which means µ = 0.6. The 
discount rate ρ is calculated by the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model: ( )–mr r rρ = +β , where r = 0.0267 and represents 
the risk-free rate, which is the average rate of government 
10-year bonds from December 2016 to November 2017, 
β = 0.5 and is a coefficient to estimate the market risk, rm 
is the risk rate and ( ) mr r−  is the equity premium, which 
is estimated at 5.25. So the discount rate ρ = 0.053. The 
annual government benefit  X P r= ⋅ , where P represents 
the land price estimated from the sale price of the land 
from the proposed location. The calculation and analysis 
process have been implemented through MATLAB pro-
gramming.
The values of the variables used in the modelling pro-
cess are given in Table 2. Applying the data to Equation 
(9), the balanced investment threshold point of the aver-
age village with 50 units can be calculated as: 0  N = 33. 
Obviously 0N N< =  35, hence it satisfies the condition 
p c gT T T≤ ≤ . When applying N  = 35 to Equations (4) 
and (8), the maximum period accepted by the government 
gT  and the minimum period accepted by the private sec-
tor pT  are solved separately. The results are  gT = 40 and 
 pT = 28. Calculating Equation (13) with the data above, 
the equilibrium solution for the concession period cT  is 
35.7 years. When  cT = 35.7, in applying this to Equations 
(3) and (7) the following results can be calculated as the 
investment threshold points for the government gN  and 
the private sector N p:  gN =  pN = 33. This satisfies the 
requirement ( )0N max ,  ,  g pN N N≥ . From these results, 
it can be concluded that, to achieve the maximum benefit 
from the whole project, the optimal concession period 
for the proposed PPP retirement village project should be 
35.7 years. Similarly, the balanced investment threshold 
point of the large village with 96 units is 60. The interval 
for this concession period is wider, up to [23, 43], and the 
final concession period is 35.6 years, which is almost the 
same as for the village with 50 units.
Table 2. Input variables of the proposed PPP retirement village
Variables 50 units 96 units
Total investment I0 (AUD) 8,180,800 15,358,740
Annual operation cost C0 (AUD) 481,500 828,600
Government annual benefit X (AUD) 24,800 45,770
Initial demand N (units) 35 67
Proportion of government 
investment K1 
0.3 0.3
Proportion of private sector 
investment K2
0.7 0.7
Weekly rent R (AUD) 330 330
Proportion of rental revenue in total 
revenue μ
0.6 0.6
Revenue volatility rate σ (%) 3.0 3.0
Annual growth rate α (%) 1.5 1.5
Discount rate ρ (%) 5.3 5.3
5.2. Implications of optimal concession period for 
government
According to Equation (13), when the total investment is 
fixed the concession period is affected by the proportion 
of government investment and the discount rate. These 
factors relate to government capability and the economic 
conditions, and their impacts on the concession period 
should be further analysed.
When determining the concession period, the govern-
ment will select its proportion of the investment based on 
the public budget. The private sector tends to be reluctant 
to invest in a PPP project if the government investment 
ratio is too low, as investors then bear most of the risk. 
But the government may reject a PPP proposal if the ratio 
is too high, which would mean that the project was still 
government-led (Xu, Peng, Qian, & Chan, 2015). The im-
pacts of various government investment ratios on the con-
cession period are presented in Figure 2. When the ratio 
increases by 10%, Tc has a significant decrease, especially 
before the ratio reaches 0.3, which indicates that early 
government investment plays a very important role in the 
determination of the concession period. The results also 
show that, with ratio increases, the concession period in-
terval range becomes gradually narrower and the trend for 
Tc is similar to that of the government boundary Tg, which 
indicates that the benefit growth of the private sector is 
less than that of the government. This is in line with the 
purpose of the government, which is building PPP retire-
ment villages to improve public welfare. The trends of the 
two cases are quite similar but, for the minimum period 
of the private sector Tp, a large-scale leads to a smoother 
change, which implies that the private sector bears lower 
project risks than with an average scale.
In this research, referring to other PPP projects, 
the upper limit of the equilibrium solution is set at 50 
years. However, most existing retirement villages have 
no more than 30 years’ service life. Those retirement vil-
lages will enter a redevelopment stage. For the proposed 
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PPP retirement village project, the government would 
need to invest at least 35–40% of the total investment to 
make Tc lower than 30 years. A high government invest-
ment ratio would require a large proportion of the pub-
lic budget and bring financial stress to the government, 
which might lead to rejection of the project. Therefore, 
in order to reduce the concession period and improve 
the viability of the project, there may be an opportunity 
to introduce third party investment into the project to 
adjust the capital structure, such as superannuation or 
age pension funds. Compared to other assets, the returns 
from PPP retirement villages are long term and stable 
(Vecchi, Hellowell, della Croce, & Gatti, 2017), which 
will attract third party investment.
The only uncertainty in the project comes from the 
change in demand and can be reflected by the revenue 
volatility rate. Figure 3 shows the impacts of the volatil-
ity rate σ on the concession period and the investment 
threshold N0. It is apparent that the length of the optimal 
concession period Tc is unaffected by change in σ, which is 
consistent with the expression in Equation (13). However, 
the rate of σ could affect the interval boundaries Tp and 
Tg and thereby impact on Tc indirectly. With σ increases, 
the government boundary Tg declines and the private sec-
tor boundary Tp rises. This can be explained by the fact 
that the private sector is more sensitive to the volatility 
rate because a higher investment risk is associated with 
greater uncertainty, so that the investment threshold N0 
rises with σ increases. The private sector prefers to delay 
investment due to the value of the option to defer. The up-
per requirement of the volatility rate in the 50 units case 
is about 0.6, while the limitation increases to 0.083 in the 
96 units case. The difference between these two cases indi-
cates that, with greater uncertainty in demand a large scale 
is preferred, which is in line with the simulation results 
of Li and Cai (2017). When σ continues to increase, the 
condition p gT T≤  cannot be satisfied as 0N N> , which 
means neither party will invest in the project.
Changes in economic conditions will also influence 
investors’ decision-making and these changes can be re-
flected by changes in the discount rate, as the discount 
rate will affect the value of the project directly. Figure 4 
gives the impacts of the discount rate on the concession 
period. It can be observed from the figure that, when the 
discount rate reaches 6% the three curves intersect at a 
point in the 50 units case, while the intersection point in-
creases to 6.8% in the 96 units case. The results are similar 
to those of Figure 3 in that, compared to the average scale, 
the large scale works better with lower sensitivity. As ρ 
continues to increase, Tc has no practical meaning. Only 
Tp increases slowly with a rise in the discount rate, while 
Tg and Tc continue decreasing and decline greatly before 
ρ reaches the limitation point. This is because a higher 
discount rate indicates that the private sector is less likely 
to receive high returns and it needs a longer period to 
receive the expected returns.
However, a higher discount rate will cause the govern-
ment to narrow the boundary in order to control excess 
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benefit. For the large scale with 96 units, the government 
and private sector could both delay investment until the 
discount rate rises to a point between 6% and 8.3% in 
order to reduce the concession period to within the 30-
year service life of the village. But for the 50 units case, a 
30-year concession period cannot be achieved unless the 
government takes measures to adjust other variables to fit 
the process.
5.3. Discussion
Similar to other PPP projects, the government depart-
ment overseeing any PPP retirement village will prefer 
the highest acceptable concession period, while the pri-
vate investor will prefer the lowest limit. Both the govern-
ment and private sectors can adapt the proposed model 
to meet each other’s requirement when determining the 
final concession period of PPP retirement villages. Espe-
cially for the private investors, various factors such as the 
government investment ratio, project discount rate and 
operation cost will significantly affect their investment 
decision-making under a bidding mode with fixed price. 
Only when the government requirements and the invest-
ment opportunities are suitable for the private investors 
will their attitude towards participating in a cooperative 
process be positive.
When economic conditions change, the government 
may make changes to encourage the initiation and im-
plementation of PPP retirement village projects. Because 
the revenue volatility rate reflects the fluctuations in the 
occupancy rate of these villages, the government should 
focus on improving service quality and consumer sat-
isfaction in order to stabilise the occupancy rate when 
the volatility rate is high. For example, the government 
could make explicit the range of options available to 
retirement village operators to improve service quality, 
rather than simply allowing a range of types of commu-
nity care provision in retirement villages. Service quality 
could also be improved through providing more funds 
to support barrier-free design of the units and facilities, 
and community care for older people. To improve con-
sumer satisfaction, the government could increase the 
amount of rent assistance paid to seniors and the basic 
Age Pension rate, or reduce the thresholds of income 
and asset tests. The government can also apply political 
strategies to allow private investors to obtain additional 
revenue from participation in PPP retirement villages. 
For example, the government could increase the size of 
a retirement village by providing extra land, or make 
the project exempt from GST. The government can also 
choose to allow the private sector to obtain more revenue 
from other services such as home care and surrounding 
advertisements.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no PPP retire-
ment villages have been constructed around the world and 
there is no real project data available for validation of the 
proposed model at this stage. For better implementation 
of the model in the practical setting of a retirement vil-
lage, the proposed conditions of the variables used in the 
model and their values as used in the case study should 
be verified by interviewing experts in future PPP projects.
Conclusions
The demand for affordable age-friendly housing is expect-
ed to increase significantly in line with the ageing popula-
tion over the coming decades. Retirement villages, with 
their small sizes and independent living style, are becom-
ing more attractive to senior retirees. To make retirement 
villages more affordable, an opportunity exists to integrate 
PPP into their construction. When applying PPP to retire-
ment villages, the concession period is one of the most 
important decision variables that influence the success of 
the project and it should be determined by considering the 
uncertainties. The investment decisions of the government 
and the private sector can be interpreted as an option to 
defer when associated with the optimisation of the conces-
sion period.
The contributions of this research can be summarised 
in relation to two aspects. First, this research proposes 
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PPP as a new procurement method for the construction 
of retirement villages to improve the independent liv-
ing environment for older people. Second, this research 
integrates early government investment into a real op-
tions model with the option to defer in order to determine 
the concession period. The results of the empirical study 
verify the calculation process and show that the proposed 
model is a valid tool to support governments in decision-
making around the concession period, especially when a 
project is otherwise financially non-viable. The analysis of 
the main variables which affect the concession period has 
indicated that an increase in investment scale is beneficial 
in improving the economic viability of PPP retirement 
village projects. The optimal concession period decreases 
with increases in the government investment ratio and 
the discount rate. The analysis has also provided some 
implications for governments in relation to taking their 
financial capability and the economic conditions into 
consideration. The recommendations include introduc-
ing third party investment, increasing the CRA amount 
and Age Pension rate, making these projects exempt from 
GST and offering rate rebates. This research provides a 
new perspective for the government and the retirement 
village industry to consider in applying PPP to retirement 
villages, and offers benefits to the development of the in-
dustry for ageing services.
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Appendix A
The value of the option to invest in the project ( )W N  
must satisfy:
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 ''1 – 0
2
N W N NW N W Nσ +α ρ =′ . (A1)
The general solution of Equation (A1) is:
( ) 1 21 2W N A N A Nβ β= + , (A2)
where: 1β  and 2β  are the solutions of the following 
quadratic equations:
( ) ( )21 –1 – – 0
2
σ β β + ρ δ β ρ = ; (A3)
2
1 2 2 2
1 – – 1 2– -  1
2 2
ρ δ ρ δ ρ 
β = + + > σ σ σ 
; (A4)
2
2 2 2 2
1 – – 1 2– – –    0
2 2
ρ δ ρ δ ρ 
β = + < σ σ σ 
.  (A5)
The value function W(N) for the option to invest 
should satisfy the following boundary conditions:
( )
( ) ( )
( )
* *
* *
0 0
–
( )
W
W N V N I
W N V N
 = =
′ = ′


, (A6)
where: V  represents the expected presented value of the 
project; I  is the sunk cost of the project and ( )0 0W =  
indicates 2A = 0 when *N N≥  investors will invest in 
the project immediately and when *N N<  investors will 
hold the option value W and wait until the threshold is 
first met to obtain the value of V I− .
Therefore, the project value F(N) can be stated as:
( )
1
*
*
*
–                       
( )
 –    
V I N N
F N N V I N N
N
β
 ≥

=   
<  
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. (A7)
In Equation (A7), the NPV of the project equals 
V I−  when *N N≥  while the value of option W equals 
( )
1
* –
N V I
N
β
 
 
 
. According to Equations (2), (6) and 
(10), the ENPV  of the government and the private sec-
tor can be written as the following:
( )
( )
1
–
– –
1 0
–
- –
1 0
ENPV 1– – –  
1- – –  
T
oT T
g
Tg oT T
g
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δ δ
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ρ δ μ ρ
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; (A8)
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. (A9)
Appendix B
Referring to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the initial condi-
tion, value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions of 
the government can be written as the following according 
to Equations (2) and (A6):
( )
( )1
1
–
– –
1 1 0
–
–1
1 1
0 0
52Re( ) 1– – –
(52Re / )( ) .
Tg oT T
g
T
g
F
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 μ
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Appendix C
Referring to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the initial condi-
tion, value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions of 
the private sector can be written as the following accord-
ing to Equations (6) and (A6):
( )
( )1
1
–
1 2 0
–
–1
1 1
0 0
52
( ) – – 1– –  
52 (1– )( )
p o T
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. (C1)
